On 22 May, Poland`s ambassador to France, Juliusz Eukasiewicz, told French Foreign Minister Georges Bonnet that if France preferred Germany to defend Czechoslovakia, “we will not budge.” The city also told Bonnet that Poland would oppose any attempt by Soviet forces to defend Czechoslovakia against Germany. Daladier told Jakob Surits [ru; de], to the Soviet ambassador to France: “Not only can we not count on Poland`s support, but we also do not believe that Poland will not hit us in the back.”  However, the Polish government has indicated on several occasions (in March 1936 and May, June and August 1938) that he was ready to fight Germany if the French decided to help Czechoslovakia: “Beck`s proposal to Bonnet to show his statements to Ambassador Drexel Biddle and to Vansittart`s statement that the Polish Foreign Minister is indeed ready to pursue a radical policy if the Western powers commit a war with Germany. But these proposals and statements did not elicit a reaction from the British and French governments, which seemed to avoid war by calming Germany.  During World War II, British Prime Minister Churchill, who opposed the agreement when it was signed, decided not to abide by the terms of the agreement after the war and to bring the Sudetenland back to post-war Czechoslovakia. On August 5, 1942, Foreign Affairs Minister Anthony Eden sent Jan Masaryk: we are invited to vote in favour of this proposal presented in the document and it is certainly a very uncontested proposal, as it is indeed the amendment that has been postponed by the opposition. For my part, I am not in a position to agree with the measures taken and, since the Chancellor of the Exchequer has put his side so forcefully, I will try to approach the matter from a different angle, if I may. I have always believed that peacekeeping depends on the accumulation of deterrents against the aggressor, with a sincere effort to remedy the situation. Mr. Hitler`s victory was, like so many famous fights that determined the fate of the world, the closest. When the statesmen returned, the full details of the Munich agreement, by which they allowed Germany to conquer the territory of the Sudetenland of Czechoslovakia, were not yet known in a failed attempt to avoid what would become World War II, and it seemed that they had made real concessions to Hitler and at least saved face. The full analysis of the historian Daniel Hucker, whose conclusion is that “the turning point of public opinion in many respects was not the coup d`état in Prague [the German invasion of March 1939], but the Munich agreement itself – shows that public support for Chamberlain after Munich is due to a reflex to decongest and confidence in its policy. The Munich quotation in foreign policy debates is also common in the 21st century.
 During negotiations on the Iran nuclear deal by Secretary of State John Kerry, a Republican representative from Texas called the negotiations “worse than Munich.” In a speech in France, Kerry himself referred to Munich for military action in Syria: “This is our munich moment.”  As the threats of Germany and a European war became increasingly evident, opinions changed. Chamberlain was awarded for his role as one of the “Men of Munich” in books such as the Guilty Men of 1940.